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Major	Michael	J.	Adams	
Report	of	the	Air	Force-NASA		
Accident	InvesIgaIon	Board	
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The	X-15	Hypersonic	Research	AircraK	
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Launch	of	the	X-15	from	the	B-52	
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Slide	Courtesy	of	X-15	Pilot	Astronaut	Bill	Dana	 6	
The	Highly	Successful	X-15	Research	Program	
•  X-15	Program	(1959	–	1968)	
–  Experimental	rocket-powered	research	vehicle		
–  Research	of	all	aspects	of	piloted	hypersonic	ﬂight	(especially	al;tude	
&	speed)	
Achieved:	
v 	 	199	ﬂights	
v 	 	4,519	mph	(Mach	6.7)	
v 	 	354,200	_	(>	67	mi)	
Data	contributed	to	Projects	Mercury,	Gemini,	&	Apollo	as	well	as	Space	
Shucle	
Some	ﬂights	qualiﬁed	as	space	ﬂights	
v  	13	ﬂights	exceeded	AF	criterion	
v  	2	ﬂights	exceeded	FAI	criterion	
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The	X-15-3	
•  Three	diﬀerent	X-15	models	were	produced.	
	
•  All	three	relied	on	a	Stability	Augmenta;on	System	–	the	ﬁrst	2	
models	had	pilot-selectable	control	gains.	
	
•  The	MH-96	Adap;ve	Flight	Control	System	was	unique	to	the	
X-15-3	–	provided	automated	gain	control	and	automated	
engagement	of	reac;on	controls.		
	
•  Pilot’s	display	in	X-15-3	was	importantly	diﬀerent	from	ﬁrst	2	
models.		
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The	Side-sIck	Controllers	
Le_	side	s;ck		
Right	side	s;ck		
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The	AQtude	Director	Indicator	in	the	X-15-3		
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Pilot’s	Display	Panel	in	the	X-15-3		
Selection switch and 
indicator light for PAI  Attitude Director Indicator 
IFDS malfunction 
light 
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The	MH-96	AdapIve	Flight	Control	System	
On	X-15-3,	the	MH-96	AFCS	was	intended	to	provide:	
	
v Automa;c	control	of	the	gain	of	inputs	to	the	
aerodynamic	control	surfaces	in	all	three	axes	as	a	
func;on	of	dynamic	pressure			
v Automa;c	engage/disengage	of	the	reac;on	controls		
v Ability	to	use	the	right	side	s;ck	for	both	aerodynamic	
and	reac;on	controls		
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ConﬁguraIon	of	X-15-3	and	Plan	for	Flight	3-65	
§ 	A	high	al;tude	ﬂight	–max	al;tude	~	250,000	feet.	
§ 	Flight	plan	and	conﬁgura;on	similar	to	previous	two	
X-15-3	ﬂights.	
§ 	65th	ﬂight	of	the	X-15-3.	
§ 	Flight	3-65	had	a	full	schedule	of	maneuvers	and	
experiments	including:	
	bow-shock	standoﬀ	measurement,		
	solar-spectrum	measurements,		
	ultraviolet	exhaust-plume	measurements,	and	
	micrometeorite	collec;on.		
§ 	Diﬀerences	in	conﬁgura;on	of	the	X-15-3	for	Flight	
3-65	included	a	traversing	probe	installed	in	the	pod	
of	its	right	wing;p	that	was	operated	for	the	ﬁrst	
;me	in	a	high-al;tude	ﬂight.	
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The	Wing-Ip	Pod	for	Experiment	InstallaIon	
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Typical	X-15	AlItude	Mission	
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Key	Events	During	Flight	3-65	
10:30:07 – Launched from B-52 at 45,000 ft. altitude with all systems 
operating normally, the pilot ignited the boost rocket, and the X-15-3 
accelerated into a steep climb.  
10:31:07 – at about 90,000’, arcing from the motor drive of the traversing 
probe caused an electrical disturbance to the aircraft’s electrical system that 
continued until 10:33:53.  Noise begins in all telemetered data channels. 
10:31:28 -  Major Adams reported IFDS computer- and the instrument-
malfunction lights. Ground Control acknowledged report. (& 10:31:58) 
10:31:34 – Pilot switched ADI to PAI mode and switched source of data for 
α and β as well as for altitude and velocity from the nose ball to IFDS and 
IMU  (while the malfunction lights were still on).  
10:31:40 to 10:32:00 – Executed wing-rock maneuver; exceeded specified 
bank angles started a slow yaw drift to the right.   
10:32:08 to 10:32:23 – Executed the computed α/β-check maneuver.  
10:32:50 – Initiated the Precision Attitude-Tracking Task   
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10:32:51 -  The Flight Controller reported to pilot, “Over the top at about 261”.  
Key	Events	During	Flight	3-65	(conInued)	
10:33:01 - The Flight Controller told the pilot that he was looking “real 
good”.  
10:33:05 – The pilot switched to direct control of the RCS using the left side 
stick.  Major Adams continued to try to complete execution of the precision 
attitude-tracking task.  
10:33:25 - The Flight Controller once again assured the pilot that he was “a 
little bit high,” but in “real good shape.”  
10:33:39 - The pilot reported that the aircraft control seemed "squirrelly.”  
10:34:01 - Major Adams said, “I’m in a spin.”  (& 10:34:16) 
10:34:30 – After three revolutions, the aircraft came out of the spin and went 
into a 45-degree inverted dive.  
10:34:37 - the MH-96 AFCS entered into a limit-cycle instability forcing 
control surfaces into rapid, cyclic oscillation to their limit of travel at their 
maximum rate of 26o per second.  
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10:34:54 - The aircraft began to break up.  
10:34:58 - The largest pieces impacted the ground   
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Time	Line	of	CriIcal	Events	Prior	to	Spin		
Approximately 3 Minutes 19	
Time	History	of	MH-96	Gains	During	Flight	3-65	 
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Time	history	Telemetered	Parameters	of	Flight	3-65		
10:30:00          10:31:00            10:32:00            10:33:00           10:34:00            10:35:00 21	
Causal	Factors	of	the	X-15-3	Accident	
A Latent Causal Factor of the Flight 3-65 accident was 
management’s failure to require environmental testing of 
experimental equipment before it was installed on the aircraft.  
A Proximate Causal Factor was the confluence of the failures of 
 1. the aircraft system design and  
 2. ground control  
to alert the pilot to the possibility of control problems and 
erroneous data when indications of malfunctions were observed.  
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Ground’s	evidence	of	problems	
Ø 	At	10:31:07	(just	1	minute	a_er	launch),	all	of	the	telemetered	data	
suddenly	became	erra;c	and	remained	so	for	several	minutes.		
Ø 	Star;ng	at	10:31:07,	the	telemetered	data	on	al;tude	and	velocity	
diﬀered	from	the	radar	data	and	was	noted	by	a	ground	controller.		
Ø 	At	10:31:58,	the	Flight	Controller	acknowledged	the	pilot’s	report	that	the	
IFDS	computer	and	instrument	malfunc;on	lights	were	on.		
Ø  Between 10:31:40 and 10:32:00, during the wing-rock maneuver, a	
member	of	ground	control	reported	to	the	Flight	Controller	that	the	pilot	
was	having	a	control	problem	based	on	his	observa;ons	of	larger	than	
normal	pitch-roll	servo	excursions.	
Ø 		At	10:32:26,	disengagement	of	the	pitch	and	roll	dampers	was	reported	
by	the	pilot	and	acknowledged	by	the	Flight	Controller.	
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10:30:45 – “We have you right on track, on the profile.”  
10:31:13 - “Okay, right on track.”  
10:31:21 - “On profile, on heading.”  
10:31:50 – “On heading, on profile.”  
10:32:19 - “Right on the track.”  
10:32:43 - “You are looking real good, right on the heading, Mike.”  
10:33:01 - “Your heading is going in the right direction, Mike, real good.”  
10:33:25 – “A little bit high, Mike, but real good shape.” 
10:34:01 – Pilot reports “I am in a spin!”  
10:34:03 - “Let’s get your experiment in and the camera on.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key	Flight	Control	Transmissions	During	Flight	3-65	
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ContribuIng	Factors	to	the	X-15-3	Accident		
1. The design of the adaptive gain control in the MH-96 allowed a failure in 
the AFCS to interfere with the pilot’s ability to control the aircraft.  
2. The design of the pilot’s interface with the MH-96 AFCS was very complex 
and difficult to understand. 
3. The MH-96 AFCS had a known tendency to go into limit-cycle oscillations 
when the system was operating at or close to maximum gain.  
4. The pilot’s display used a single critical instrument, the Attitude Director 
Indicator, in two different modes; one a normal mode used most of the time, 
the other a mode (Precision Attitude Indicator) that was used only 
occasionally.  
5. There was no provision for backup source of reliable information for the 
pilot at high altitude when the IFDS computer malfunctioned.  
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ContribuIng	Factors	to	the	X-15-3	Accident	(cont.)	
6. Major Adams failed to correct the error in yaw when he switched to direct 
control of the RCS through the left side stick.  
7. Evidence suggests that Major Adams’ responses to the PAI were consistent 
with an ADI mode when he switched to the left-hand stick control of the RCS.  
8. Evidence indicates that Major Adams forgot to disengage the MH-96 AFCS 
as he was supposed to when he switched to the left side stick control.  
9. A speculation in the AIB  report and elsewhere was that Major Adams’ 
susceptibility to Type II Spatial Disorientation was a Contributing Factor in the 
scenario of this accident.  
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Conclusions	
1. The electrical disturbance due to arcing of unqualified experimental 
equipment precipitated the accident. 
2. The pilot had no reliable control during the electrical disturbance.  
3. The pilot was, very likely, unable to recognize the control problems. 
4. Flight 3-65 would have very likely been recoverable, if ground control had 
aborted the mission when they had clear indications of malfunctions.  
5. The focus of Major Adam’s attention on performing the precise wing-rock 
maneuver using an intermittent RCS may have distracted him from noticing 
the yaw angle acquired during the boost phase.  
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Conclusions	(cont.)	
7. The pilot’s ability to manage the aircraft’s various malfunctions when he 
switched to direct control was affected by an extremely high workload 
perhaps exacerbated by Spatial Disorientation at that particular moment.  
8. The limit-cycle oscillations of controls would have been prevented had 
Major Adams disengaged the MH-96 AFCS when he switched to manual 
control. 
 
9. The destruction of the X-15-3 was due to the structural loads produced by 
the high frequency limit-cycle oscillations of the control surfaces induced by 
the AFCS.  
 
6. There was no evidence that Spatial Disorientation degraded Major Adam’s 
performance during the boost phase or the execution of the experimental 
maneuvers.  
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Thank	you!	
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